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Limitations on Use of the 
California Homestead Exemption 
in Bankruptcy Cases: 
The Case for Following In re Pladson 
By Jeffrey C. Wmms and Leslie A. Burton1 
Two decisions, a 1991 California Court of Appeal decision, Spencer v. Lowery,2 and 
1993 United States District Court for the Northern District of California decision, In re 
~la<tso;n;3 severely restricted the homestead exemption available in bankruptcy cases filed 
California. Some bankruptcy courts have refused to follow the Spencer and Pladson 
and the California Legislature ("Legislature') has passed new legislation on the use 
the homestead e'femption in bankruptcy. This article will explore the background and 
rati(lDale of the deCisions and the legislative scheme, and offer support for limiting the 
IOrn.estlead exemption in bankruptcy cases. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 20, 1991, the California Court of Appeal issued its opinion in Spencer, 
resrnCllDg the scope of the California automatic homestead exemption to the proceeds of 
judgment execution sales. Pladson applied Spencer to bankruptcy sales and found 
the automatic homestead exemption did not apply to the proceeds of such sales. Thus, 
WJllcruptc:y debtors could no longer can rely on California Code of Civil Procedure 4 
704. to claim an exemption of $50,000 to $100,000' in equity in a residence sold by 
I Jeffrey C. Wurrns is an associate with Wendel, Rosen,. Black, Dean & Levitan in Oakland, California. He successfuUy 
,,=::::the trustee in I" nlPIadson. Leslie A. Burton also is au associate at Wendel, Rosen,. Black. Dean & Levitan, and 
~ at Hastings College of Law . 
. '23S Cal. App. 3d 1636 (1991). 
'IS4 B.R. 305 (N.D. Cal. 1993). PIadson is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Briefs have been filed and 
arguments were held on February 11. 1994. 
"Except for those instances where the context refers to the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C.), all references to "Section" 
R>uglhout this article are references to the California Code of Civil Procedure. 
'CAL. CoDE CIv. PROC. § 704.720 provides in part: 
(8) A homestead is exempt from sale Wlder this division to the extent provided in § 704.800. 
(b) If a homestead is sold under this division ... the proceeds ofsa1e ... are exempt in the amount 
of the homestead exemption provided in § 704.730. 
The exemption is often referred to as the "automatic" homestead exemption to distinguish it from the declared 
exemption found in CAL. CODE CIV. PROC'. §§ 704.910-704.99.5. 
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a bankruptcy trustee. The debtor could rely only on section 703.l40(b)(I) to claim an 
exemption of up to $7,500' of equity in .. iesidence. 
II. TWO CHOICES. THEN TWO CHOICES AGAIN: 
THE FEDERAL AND CALIFORNIA HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS 
A. FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY lAW GIVES A BANKRUPTCY DEBTOR 
A CHOICE BETWEEN TWO HOMESTEAD EXEMPTIONS 
The current Bankruptcy Code exemption scheme (in relevant part unchanged since 
enacted in 1978) is found in Bankruptcy Code § 522 and gives bankruptcy debtors a choice 
between two sets of exemptions.' The debtor has a choice between exempting his property 
under the federal bankruptcy exemptions set forth in section 522(d) ("federal bankruptcy 
exemptions'), which include a $7,500 homestead exemption, or other nonbankruptcy-
specific exemptions available under local, state, and federal law ("nonbankruptcy 
exemptions"): Whether nonbankruptcy exemptions contain a homestead exemption 
depends on the law adopted by the bankruptcy debtor's state of residence, but the 
Bankruptcy Code does not require such an exemptionlO 
, 
Section 522(b)(1) gives each state the right to "opt out" of the federal bankruptcy 
exemptions and to limit state residents to the nonbankruptcy exemptions available to them.1I 
Upon "opt out," the state exemptions are applied in bankruptcy just as they are applied 
outside of bankruptcyl2 
'( ... continued) 
'cAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 704.73O(a). h is incorrect for bankruptcy debtors to exempt their residence using § 704.730. 
The section does not create an ex~ption, but only states the' amount of the homestead exemption created by § 704.72O(b). 
Redwood Empire Production Credit Association v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 824 F.2d 7S4. 758 (9th Cit. 1981). 
'A bankruptcy debtor may merease the exemption from $7,500 to $7,900. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 703.14O(b)(5). 
'Bloom v. Robinson (In re Bloom~ 839 F.2d 1376, 1378 (9th Cit. 1988); Daniel v. Security Pacific National Bank (In 
re Daniel~ TIl F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cit. 1985). 
'II U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) provides m part: 
(b) [A]n individual debtor may exempt from property of the estate the property listed in either paragraph (1) or, in 
the alternative. paragraph (2) of this subsection ... Such property m-
(1) property that is specified Wlder subsection (d) of this section. ... 
(2) [A]ny property that is exempt under Federal law, other than subsection (d) of this section. or State or 
Jocallaw that is applicable on the date of the filing of the petition ... 
IIIOwen v. Owen,. III S. Ct .• 1833, 1835 (1991)~ Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419, 429 (9th Clr. 1991) withdrawn on other 
grounds 992 F.2d 224 (9th Cit. 1993); England v. Golden (In re Golden1 789 F.2d 698, 700 (9th Cit. 1986~ 
11789 F.2d at 700. 
121n Fe Schneider, 9 B.R. 488. 490 (N.D. CaL 1981)~ see. Owen. 111 S. CL at 183'~ Pitrat. 947 F.2d at 429~ Golden. 719 
F.2d at 700. 
-324- Vol. 21 Cal. Bmkr. J. No.4 (1993) 
The Courts may not expand the scope of the exemptions, except when avoiding a lien 
der Bankruptcy Code § 522(f).13 The limited authority to expand is a direct derivative 
'Of the language of Bankruptcy Code § 522(f). No other section of the Bankruptcy Code 
j,ontains similar language which would support expanding the exemptions to of bankruptcy 
,~-, 
~JaIes. When a bankruptcy sale is conducted, the court must apply the debtor's exemptions 
.~lils they exist under Bankruptcy Code § 522(b), instead of hypothesizing what the 
~l~mptions ''would have been" for purposes of Bankruptcy Code § 522(f). 
'f:,; In 1984, California chose to "opt out."" California residents, therefore, can exempt 
.(property only under California and federal nonbankruptcy exemption laws, including the 
i;\CaIifomia homestead exemption of section 704.720. 
?' 
B. CAliFORNIA LAW GIVES BANKRUPTCY DEBTORS 
THE IDENTICAL HOMESTEAD EXEMP110N 
ENJOYED BY JUDGMENT DEBTORS UNDER SECTION 704.720 
WITHOUT EXPANDING ITS SCOPE 
• 
1. The Exemptions Apply In Bankruptcy 
. The Same As Under State Law 
A recent ease" critical of Spencer and Pladson interpreted section 703.140(a)16 as a 
vehicle for expanding the scope of the nonbankruptcy exemptions as authorized by 
Ill] u.s.c. § 522(f) provides for the avoidance of judicial liens and nonpossessory nonpurchase money security interests 
ill certain property to the extent that the liens and interests impair an exemption which the debtor "would have been entitled" 
to claim. In Owen, 111 S. Ct at 1835, the court held that ahbough a Florida exemption protecting homesteads from forced 
aaIcs did not include the debtor's residence, the debtor was entitled nevertheless to avoid a judgment lien on the residence. 
The Court recognized that under Florida law the residence was not exempt and that its holding expanded the exemption. The 
Court found, however, that the specific language of Bankruptcy Code § 522(0. which allows the debtor to avoid interest in 
property to which the debtor would have been entitled, expressly authorized the expansion. III S.CL at 1836-37. The Court 
reasoned that this language denotes a hypothetical state of affairs warranting avoidance of a lien because if the lien had not 
been recorded, the debtor could have exempted the residence under Florida law. 
14CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 703.130. 
lSin re Norman. 157 B.R 460,463 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993). Norman is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel. The parties have requested a stay of the proceedings pending the Ninth Circuit's decision in PkIdson. 
16CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 703.140(8)' before its October 1993 amendment provided: 
(a) If 8 petition is filed under Title 11 of the United States Code, the exemptions provided by this 
chapter other than the provisions of subdivision (b) of this section shall be applicable, but the exemptions 
provided by aubdivision (b) may be elected in lieu of aU other exemptions provided by this chapter .... 
Except for the last section which discusses amended § 703.140, this article will focus on § 703.140 as it existed at 
the time of the PkIdson decision. 
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section 703.010." This position is not supported by the text of the statute or its legislative 
history. 
Section 703.140 states that when a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, the California 
nonbankruptcy exemptions "shall be applicable." The word "applicable" is a fOlm of "to 
apply." "Apply" is used when referring to the process by which a statute is made 
operative.'· It would be contrary to the plain meaning of the term "apply" to hold that 
"applying" exemptions means "expanding" exemptions in bankruptcy instead of simply 
making them operative. Bankruptcy debtors, therefore, can exempt ouly property which a 
judgment debtor can exempt. Anything more would be an expansion of section 704.720 
through section 703.140. 
Section 703.140's legislative history is consistent with the plain meaning of applying 
the state exemptions as they are and clearly shows that the statute was not enacted to 
expand their scope. The sole purpose of section 703.140 was to prohibit the practice of 
"stacking"" by eliminating the California bankruptcy debtors' right to claim the federal 
bankruptcy exemptions. A statute passed to limit bankruptcy debtors' exemption options 
logically cannot be used as a basis to expand the scope of the exemptions. The Legislature 
reiterated in section 703.140(a) that bankruptcy debtors have the right to exempt their 
property under state, local', and federal nonbankruptcy law. If it wished to expand that 
right, it could have done so explicitly. In fact, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that 
exemptions should not be expanded but should be applied in bankruptcy as they exist under 
state law.20 
t'When it enacted the exemptions, the Legislature originally restricted them to judgment debtors. The Legislature also 
enacted CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 703.010, which provides that the scope oCthe exemptions may be statutorily expanded 
beyond the enforcement of money judgments. Section 703.010 provides: 
Except as otherwise provided by statute: 
<a) The exemptions provided by this chapter or by any other statute apply to all procedmes for 
enforcement of a money judgment. 
(b) The exemptions provided by this chapter or by any other statue do not apply if the judgment 
10 be enforced is for the foreclosure of a mortgage, deed of trust, or other lien or encumbrance on the property 
other than a lien created pursuant to this division or pursuant to Tille 6.:5 (commencing with § 481.010) 
(allachment). 
I'BLACK'S LAw DIcnONARY (6th ed. 1990). 
''Baldwin v. Marshall (I. re Baldwin1 70 B.R. 612, 615 (9Ih Cir. BAP 1987), citing CaJif. Legislature Senate Comm. 
on Judiciary, Selected Bill Analysis, vol. 3, p. 2; I. TO Petruzzelli, 139 1lR. 241,244 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Im)("[Sectioo 
703.140) was enacted because Califomia wished 10 pennit debtors to have the benefit of the federal bankruptcy exemptions 
while precluding joint debtors from the much-.criticized practice of "stacking" in which one spouse would claim federal 
exemptions and the other spouse would claim state exemptions, thereby reaping the best for both .... [AJfter banniog 
"staclcing," [the LegisJalure J enacIcd the federal bankruptcy exemptions under the guise of ..... law."); , .. I. re Lenncn. 71 
B.R. 80, 71-82 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1981). 
"Schneider,9 B.R. at 490; see 1lIImadge v. Duck (I. re TaJmadge1832 F.2d 1120, 1123 (9Ih Cir. 1981); Goldelt, 789 
F.ld at 700, PetruzzelJi. 139 B.R at 244~ 1992 Creditors' Remedies Legislation. 16 Cal. L Revision Comm'n Reports 1001, 
1098-99 (1982). 
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2. Treating Bankruptcy Sales and Execution Sale 
As Equivalents Would Expand the Exemption 
Nothing in either the text of section 703.140(a), nor in its legislative history, indicates 
it transforms a baokruptey sale into an execution sale. In fact, such a holding would 
contrary to the Ninth Circuit's holding that a bankruptcy trustee's power of sale is 
ridiistiJ~ct from the power of a judgment creditor under California law.2I 
3. Section 704.720 and the Other Nonbankruptcy Exemptions 
Continue to Have Validity in Bankruptcy Cases 
Pladson does not leave section 703.140(a) or the nonbaokruptcy exemptions with no 
in bankruptcy cases, as one recent case maintains.22 Admittedly, section 703.140 is 
necessary to allow bankruptcy debtors to exempt the property found in the 
onb,ankJUpltcy exemptions; that is the function of Bankruptcy Code § 522(b).23 Instead, 
703.140(a) authorizes bankruptcy debtors to choose between the nonbankruptcy 
liernpjtiol~s available to judgment debtors or a different set of exemptions found in section 
U l..'''U'1 0 I and avaiJable only to baokruptey debtors, and through its interaction with 
703.110 prohibits married debtors from choosing both." Section 703.140(a) does 
expand the section 704.720 exemption beyond execution sales proceeds. After Pladson, 
section 704.720 homestead exemption still applies in bankruptcy cases, and may be used 
a money judgment is enforced prepetition and surplus execution sale proceeds become 
IIlI'Ier1y of a bankruptcy estate, or when a debtor seeks to avoid a lien. 
21Scbwaber v. Reed (In re Reed). 940 F.2d 1317. 1322 n.7 (9th Cir. 1991) (the court rejected the motion that • bankruptcy 
, power to sell is limited by law to the same extent as a judgment creditor's power to sell). 
/ 't2NQrman, IS7 B.R at 463, 465 . 
. uNorman, IS7 B.R at 463. 
:: kAt least on court has found § 703.140 unconstitutional, holding that the Legislature violated the unifonnity clause by 
a set of Califomia bankruptcy exemptions, when the only power given to the states was to "opt out" of the federal 
exemption. Lennen, 71 B.R. at 82. 
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III. BECAUSE SECTION 704.720 LIMITS 
A BANKRUPTCY DEBTOR'S HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION 
TO PROCEEDS OF A RESIDENCE SOLD BY EXECUTION SALE, 
THE EXEMPTION DOES NOT APPLY TO BANKRUPTCY SALES 
A. SPENCER PROPERLY USED THE CANONS 
OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
TO INTERPRET SECTION 704.720. 
1. Using the Plain Meaning of Section 704.720, 
the Court of Appeal in Spencer Defined the Scope 
of the Homestead Exemption to Include 
Only the Proceeds of an Execution Sale of a Residence 
In the Spencer case,25 the California Court of Appeal defined the scope of the 
California nonbankruptcy homestead exemption under section 704.720(b). 
The Spencer court examined the language of section 704. 720(b), 26 and noted that it 
gave a homestead exemptiop in the proceeds of a residence "sold under this division." The 
court found "this division" to be a clear, unambiguous reference to Division 2 of TItle 9 
of the California Code of Civil Procedure, a division devoted exclusively to the enforcement 
of money judgments. Thus, it held that only the proceeds of sales to enforce money 
judgments (execution sales), not all forced sales, are exempt under section 704.720(b). 
'There is nothing ambiguous or uncertain in § 704.720(b) which would require us to 
examine any policy concerns or legislative history. Since defendants' property was not sold 
in execution of a money judgment, they are not entitled to the statutory homesteod 
exemption. ,m 
Spencer properly relied on the statute's plain meaning. The policy of interpreting a 
statute by its plain meaning is strong, and courts will refiain from usurping the legislative 
function, especially in the area affecting the balance between a debtor's fresh start and 
creditors' rights. The Ninth Circuit has reiterated this policy in three recent cases: Cheng 
15The Spencen were judgment debtors (not in bankruptcy) who lost their residence through a nonjudicial foreclosure sale 
(8 sale under a power of sale clause in a deed of trust). At the foreclosure sale, a third party purchased the residence for more 
than the demand amount, creating a surplus. The Spencers and a judgment lienholder argued over the disposition of tbe 
surplus., each of them claiming entitlement to it. The Spencen argued that the § 704.720 exemption encompassed all forced 
sales. and that the proceeds of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale were proceeds of a forced sale entitled to exemption under that 
section. Although the trial court agreed with the Spencers and allowed the exemption, the California Court of Appeal 
reversed. 
HDroeger v. Friedman, Sloan & Ross, S4 Cal. 3d 26, 38 (1991) (when a statute's language is clear, its plain meaning 
should be followed despite the iK:lcnowledged hardship it would impose); Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bel., 10 CaL 
3d 222, 230 (1973) (to effectuate the purpose of the law, the court fun should examine the language of the statute). 
:t7235 Cal. App. 3d 1638 (emphasis added). The Spencer court nevertheless examined the legislative history of CAL. COVE 
CIY. PRoc. § 704.720 and found that it was not contrary to the statute's plain meaning. As long as the plain meaning of. 
statute is consistent with some legislative history, it must be applied. People v. Belleci, 24 Cal. 3d 879, 884-86 (1974); people 
v. Boyd, 24 Cal. 3d 28S, 294-97 (1919). 
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v. Gill (In re Cheng),111 Beezley v. California Land Title Company (In re Beezley)," and City 
National Bank v. Chabot (In re Chabot).30 
The court in Spencer followed the plain meaning of section 704.720(b), correctly 
declining to rewrite the California Legislature's exemption scheme or broaden its scope." 
In so doing, it followed the weight of judicial authority. 
2. Legislative History Supports Spencer's Interpretation 
a. A 1983 Change in Exemption Law Repealed 
the Only Provision Allowing an Exemption in Bankruptcy Soles 
The legislative history of section 704.720 supports applying Spencer's plain meaning 
interpretation in bankruptcy cases. 
Until recently, the bankruptcy debtor's residence was exempt from bankruptcy sales 
.•. under California homestl:ad law.32 Previous California Civil Code § 1240" exempted the 
.n:!lidence from both ex~cution and forced sales." Civil Code §§ 1256 and 1257 exempted 
~43 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1991). In Cheng, the Ninth Circuit held that a debtor who was the sole OWDer of his corporation 
mtitlcd to exempt his interest in the corporation's retirement plan under the plain meaning of CAL. CODE crv. PROC. § 
15. The court reasoned: 
Although the legislative history indicates that the policy behind section 704.11S(e) is to limit the exemption 
for plans that are controlled by one person. the stabde says what it says. and itwas improper for the 
bankruptcy court to read beyond it ... We recognize the odd result the statute creates ... but we may not 
disregard the statute"s language to address problems properly 
left to the legislature. 
1117. 
"994 F.2d 1433 (9th CiT. 1993). In Beezley, the NUrth Circuit addressed the Wue of whether a debto~. case mould be 
to discharge a debt. Finding that the clear language of § 523(a) was not an abeJTation, but a Congressional policy 
the court rejected the creditor's attempts to look beyond the plain meaning of the statute. "How 10 s1rike that balance 
Ir;~:the rights of creditors and debtors] is an inordinately diffICUlt question-a question of public policy. . .. Our task a relatively easier one, for we have only to apply the law as Congress has wriUen it .. ld. at 1439.40. 
"992 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1993). In Chabot, the Ninth Circuit rejected an intctprctation of 11 U.S.C. § 522(1) with 
to the "fresh start" policY, applying instead the statute's plain meaning. ld at 89+895. 
,:' llAnder30n. 824 F.ld at 7S9~ Security First Nat. Bk. v. Pierson, 2 Cal. 2d 63, 65 (1934); Berbanu v. Metzger, 12 Cal. App. 
445,448 (1992) . 
. ~aylor v. Madigan, 53 Cal. App. 3d 943, 957, 959 n.ll (1975) (the homestead exemption is pw-ely of statutory origin 
no roots in common law. From the time that the § 1240 homestead exemption was adopted in 1872 until its amendment 
the homestead exemption remained virtually unchanged). 
CIv. CODE § 1240 provided: The homestead is exempt from execution or forced sale, except as in this TItle 
:; ~ot all forced sales are execution sales for purposes of the homestead exemption. For instance. a sale in an action to 
is a type offon:ed sal. which is not an .xecution sale. See Kaupc v. Kaupc, 131 Cal. App. 2d 511, 514 (1955); 
v. Walton, 59 Cal. App. 2d 26 (1943). 
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r 
the proceeds of execution and forced sales of homesteads." 
forced sales, the exemptions applied to them. 
Q 
Because bankruptcy sales are 
In 1983, while revising the laws relating to the enforcement of judgments and related 
exemptions, the Legislature changed the homestead exemption.'· The homestead 
exemptions previously contained in Civil Code §§ 1240 and 1256 were repealed, 
superseded, and replaced by section 704.720." A review of section 704. 720's language and 
related legislative comments and statutes indicates that the section 704.720 homestead 
exemption does not apply to bankruptcy sales. 
In section 704.720, the Legislature removed the language allowing a homestead 
exemption in all forced sale proceedings (including bankruptcy sales), and retained only the 
language allowing the exemption against execution sales. The legislative comment 
unequivocally states that the homestead exemption will apply only to execution sales" 
Certainly, there is no presumption that the homestead exemption for forced sales survived 
the revision.'" This deliberate omission of the term "forced sales" by the Legislature may 
not be ignored by a court interpreting the statute.'" 
In California, it is presumed that each word, phrase, or provision of a statute has 
meaning and performs a useful function." Applying section 704.720 to bankruptcy sales, 
UCAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1256 and 1257 (known respectively as CAL. crv. CODE §§ 1255 and 12S6 from the time oftbeir 
1979 revision until their 1983 repeal) applied to execution and forced sales. Chase v. Bank of America, 227 Cal. App. 2d 
259 (1964). 
l6uExisting law contains an extensive and comprehensive statutory scheme relative to the enforcement of judgments in 
civil actions, including specific provisions on execution of judgments ... This bill would repeal the above provisions and. 
instead, would enact a new comprehensive statute governing the enforcement of jUdgments. This bill would continue many 
of the existing provisions and features of existing law, but would also enact numerous changes." Petruzzelli, 139 B.R. at 242 
0...2, citing 1982 Cal. legis. Summary Digest of statutes Enacted And Resolutions Adopted. at 490 (emphasis a.dded)~ 
Anderson. 824 F.2d at 755. 761 (Cmding: the revisions minor in the sense that debtors were not completely deprived ofa 
homestead exemption, the court acknowledged that the revisiooa substantially altered the homestead exemption). 
neAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1237-1304 relating to the declared homestead were repealed and superseded by CAL.. COnE av. 
PRoc. §§ 704.710-704.850 and 704.910-704.990. slats. 1982, c. 497, § 8, openItive July I, 1983; Leg;.lative Co_ 
Comment-Senate 1982 Repeal. Additionally, Subdivision (I) of § 704.720 supersedes fonner CIv. CODE § 1240 and portions 
of former CIv. CODE § 1256. CAL. CODE crv. PRoc. § 704.720 Legislative Committee Conunent-Senate 1982 Addition. 
lI"[Subdivision (a)] does not apply where a lien on the property other than an enforcement lien is being foreclosed. ' . 
. Subdivision (b) provides an exemption for proceeds ofan execution sale of a homestead." CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 704.720 
Legislative Committee Comment-Senate 1982 Addition. 
The comment also refers to voluntary sales. but the reference simply distinguishes the automatic homestead exemption 
from the exemption for voluntary sales under CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 704.910-704.995. 
"Compare Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S.Ct. 527, 532 &. n.15 (1991) (when a statutory scheme is repealed and revised 
to include substantial changes, an assumption that the legislature intended the new scheme to- preserve pre-existing law iI 
incorrect) with Dewsnup v. Tunm. 112 S. Ct. 773, 779 (1992) (Court considered legislative silence as an indication that pte"' 
revision law survived when the new language was ambiguous). 
-Talmadge, 832 F.ld at 1124 (9th Cir. 1987); People v. Valentin., 28 Cal. 2d 121, 142 (1946~ 
"Talmadge, 832 F.2d at 1123; Gay Law Students Assn. v. P",ific T.1. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458, 478 (1979);CI-
v. T. R. Bechtel Co., 43 Cal. 2d 227, 233 (1954); Smith v. Rh.a, 72 Cal. App. 3d 361, 370 (1977). 
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fwbic:b are not execution sales under Division 2, would improperly make the phlllSe "under 
division" superfluous. 
b. Related Statutes Support Pladson's Denial 
of the Homestead Exemption to Bankruptcy Sales 
The Legislature's intent to limit section 704.720 to proceeds of execution sales is also 
!Igleal~ed from the language of related exemption statutes." The Legislature made a clear 
Ifdistinction between the section 704.720 exemption and other exemptions. 
Only section 704.720 exempts "proceeds" of an execution sale. No other exemption 
!If tanlliblle property refers solely to proceeds or requires that equity first be converted into 
ITOc:eelils by a particular type of sale; instead they exempt "equity," "interest," or "value," 
[eSC:riPltiOflS which apply with equal force to all types of sales. "Equity" and "proceeds" 
not synonymous te=s, and any other interpretation of section 704.720 would ignore 
defined and accepted definitions of and differences between those te=S.43 Certainly, 
Legislature could have drafted section 704.720 more like the other exemptions, avoiding 
"sale under this divi!lion" language and exempting the ''value of' or "equity in" the 
rop:rty instead of the :'proceeds." Its failure to do so must be regarded as intentional." 
Another related exemption statute, section 703.010," gives further support for the 
ro~~~:~~th:~at section 704.720 does not apply to bankruptcy sales. Section 703.010 
ft limits the use of the exemptions in its chapter, which includes section 704.720, 
proceedings to enforce specific types of money judgments. It does not include all forced 
or bankruptcy sales. 
'. UWben one statute contains a provision,. the omission of that provision from a related or similar statute is significant to 
that a different intention existed. Penasquitos, Inc. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal3d 1180, 1188-89 (1991); Clements, 43 
at 232; VaknU .. , 28 Cal. 2d at 142; Smith, 72 Cal. App. 3d at 367-68 (when language regarding payment of 
sales proceeds appeared in one exemption statute but not another, the omission wu indicative of legislative intent). 
Uo.Equity" means the fair market value of the interest of the judgment debtor in property, ... over and above all liens 
encumbrances on the interest superior to the judgment creditor's lien. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 680.190. 
"Proceeds" means things of value arising or obtained by the sale of property. BLACKS UW DIcnONARY, 6th ed.; lee 
CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 697.620; CAL. COMM. CODE § 9306; CAL. CIV. CODE § 222S; CAL. FOOD & AG. CODE §§ 
S7S0S, S7SS4 . 
. "'People v. Drake, 19 CaI.3d 749, 7'5 (1977) ("'When a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, 
omiuion of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that • different 
. exiatedl'''(quoting People v. Valentine, 28 CaI.2d 121, 142 (1946»). 
:' USee note 17, ,upra (text ofeAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 703.010). 
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c. Legislative Inaction Does Not Indicate Legislative Intent 
At least one court 46 has aJgued that the Legislature must intend for bankruptcy debtors 
to exempt their homesteads under section 704.720 because the Legislature has not reviSed 
sections 703.l40(a) or 704.720 to prevent the practice. Legislative inaction, however, does 
not indicate legislative approval.·' 
B. FEDERAL COURTS ARE BOUND 
BY SPENCER'S INTERPRETA110N OF SEC110N 704.720 
AND MUST APPLY IT IN BANKRUPTCY 
Federal courts are bound in bankruptcy cases by relevant California cases interpreting 
the homestead exemption.48 When a California Court of Appeal rules on an exemption 
issue, federal courts must apply that rule absent a contrary ruling by the California Supreme 
Court·' Only if the federal court finds convincing evidence that the California Supreme 
Court would decide differently may it refuse to follow the Court of Appeal decision." 
Because Spencer employed the proper rules of statutory construction, there is no such 
evidence.51 
Before Spencer, there was no binding state court decision and it was appropriate for 
the federal courts to interpret section 704.720. With the filing of the Spencer decision, 
however, previous federal interpretations were superseded and the federal courts became 
bound to follow Spencer." 
~In re Donaldson. IS6 B.R. SI, S3 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1993~ 
47People v. King, S Cal. 4th 59, 75, 77 (1993) (the legislative failure to address a court's interpretation of a statute does 
not imply legislative approval because its failure may be attributable to many things unrelated to the merits of the court's 
interpretation. e.g., the pressure of other and more important business, political considerations, or a tendency to trust to the 
courts to correct their own errors). 
"Anderson, 824 F.2d at 7S6; see also Page v. Edmunds,23 s. Ct 200, 202 (1902) (federal court must yield to state court 
cases interpreting state statutes); Hyman v. Plotkin (In,. Hyman1123 B.R. 342, 344 (9th Cir. BAP 1991) (California state 
law controls substantive questions involving homestead exemption rights); I" 1'6 Frost, III B.R. 306. 310 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
1990) (bankruptcy court is bound by state court interpret:ation tbat tax liens are subject to state exemptions). 
"'Compare State Farm Fire and Casuahy v. Abrio, 874 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1989) (case involving issue decided by the 
California Court of Appeal, but not by the California Supreme Court) with Ulvestad v. Chevron U.S.A, Inc., 818 F. Supp. 
292 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (case involving issue never previously addressed by either California Supreme Court or California Court 
of Appeal). 
"State Farm. 874 F.2d at 621; Klingebiel v. Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. 494 F.2d 343. 346 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979). 
"Although two California Court of Appeal cases, Uttle v. Community Bank. 233 Cal. App. 3d 333 (1991) and Webb 
v. Trippet, 233 Cal. App. 3d 647 (1991). refer to forced sales in dicta when discussing the application of the exemption under 
CAL. CODE crv. PROC. § 704.720, the discussions are inapplicable here because the cases involved execution sales and the 
courts had no reason to distinguish the two types of sales for purposea of applying the exemption. 
uAnderson, 824 F.2d at 759 (federal courts do not have a license to rewrite the California legislature's exemption scheme 
or to broaden its scope)~ Schneider, 9 B.R. at 940 (state court decision should guide exemption interpretations.) 
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Some courts critical of Spencer and Pladson have asserted that Spencer's holding that 
the exemption applies only to execution sale proceeds is dictum," or that Spencer does not 
apply in a bankruptcy context.54 These assertions do not withstand scrutiny. 
The issue in Spencer was whether section 704.720 allowed debtors to exempt the 
proceeds of all forced sales, and specifically proceeds of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. In 
its analysis, the Spencer court compared section 704.720 to the related provisions of section 
i703.010(b)." Section 703.010 discusses judicial foreclosure sales while Spencer involved 
a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.56 If section 703.01O(b) were dispositive, the court would not 
have provided a detailed analysis of section 704.720(b). 
The Spencer court used section 703.01O(b) to illustrate that including all forced sales 
.within the ambit of "sale(s) under this division" as used in section 704.72O(a) would create 
~:the absurd result of prohibiting foreclosure sales unless the sale price satisfied all 
rencumbrances and the homestead exemption. Because foreclosure sales are not so limited, 
';"sale under this division" could not mean all forced sales" Spencer's holding is sound. 
Moreover, an rugument that Spencer should not be followed because it does not 
,_. ____ the scope of the homestead exemption in a bankruptcy context has been rejected. 
hold otherwise would render most state court interpretations of its exemption statutes 
jtmLeaIrin!~le!;s in bankruptcy cases. 58 
"Norman. 1S7 B.R. at 46.5 (asserts that Spencer was not based on § 704.720. but on § 703.01O(b». 
J4Donaldscm. IS6 B.R. at .53 (asserts that Spencer stands fOT the narrow proposition that the § 704.720 homestead 
..... ,pti< .. does not apply to foreclO3Ul'e wes). 
"See note 17. supra. 
~onjudicial foreclosure sales are governed by CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. §§ 2924--2924k. Judicial foreclosure sales are 
by CAL CODE avo PRoc. §§ 72~.-730.~. The former is • "private .ale," the latter is an -execution sale." Coppola 
. Superior Court. 211 Cal. App. 3d 848, 873, ,..hrg. de.ied (1989~ 
'. "23~ Cal. App. 3d at 1638-1639. 
. "Schneider, 9 B.R. at 49l. 
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C A SALE BY A BANKRUPTCY TRUSTEE IS NOT 
AN EXECU110N SALE AND IS NOT SUBJECT 
TO THE SECTION 704.720 HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION 
Although Spencer first held that the section 704.720 exemption applies to the 
proceeds of execution sales only,'· Pladson was the first court to combine the two 
principles that (I) section 704.720 only applies to execution sales and (2) a sale by a 
bankruptcy trustee is not an execution sale, and therefore to conclude that section 704.720 
does not apply to bankruptcy sales. 
In Pladson, the bankruptcy debtors claimed a $52,000 exemption in their residence 
under section 704. 720(b). The trustee objected on the grounds that the residence would not 
be sold by execution sale and that section 704. 720(b) did not exempt proceeds of a 
bankruptcy sale. The Pladson court, recognizing that bankruptcy sales were not execution 
sales, agreed with the trustee and disallowed the exemption.'" 
P ladson followed the firm weight of Ninth Circuit and California law which holds 
that bankruptcy sales are not execution sales'! Similarities between the two types of sales 
do not eliminate their Jdistinctions" 
Despite the recdgnized distinction between bankruptcy and execution sales, two recent 
cases have held that they are equivalent." These cases incorrectly apply Bankruptcy Code 
§§ 544 and 522(f). 
A bankruptcy trustee sells the estate's property under Bankruptcy Code § 363, 
pursuant to his bankruptcy powers, not as a judgment creditor under Bankruptcy Code § 
'tsecause Spencer involved a trust deed sale. it was not called upon to decide whether bankruptcy sales are the same as 
execution sales. 
fOPladson, 154 B.R. at 306-307. 
'lEwell v. Diebert (In re Ewell). 9S8 F.2d 276 (9th Cir. 1992); Reed, 940 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1991); In re 
Transcontinental Energy Corp., 683 F.2d 326 (9th Cir. 1982); In re CADA lnv., lnc., 664 F.2d llS8 (9th Cir. 1981); Travelers 
Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, S09 F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1974); Coppola v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 848 (1989). See also In,. 
Met-L-Wood Corp., 861 F.2d 1012 (7th Cir. 1988), cerro denied, 109 S. Ct. 1642 (1988). 
Q In Hyman, 967 F.2d 1316. the court compared an execution sale to a bankruptcy sale while addressing the issue of 
whether the debtor could reap the benefit of postpetition appreciation. The issue crystallized the distinction between 
exemptions in the proceeds of execution sales and bankruptcy sales. The issue of appreciation never arises with an execution 
sale, yet it does in bankruptcy sales because the debtor's property may appreciate between the time the exemption is claimed 
and the time of sale. The court resolved the appreciation problem in bankruptcy by holding that the exemption would, II 
in execution sales, be applied on the sale date. If the sales were identical., however. there would have been no need to 
compare the two. 
C Norman, IS7 B.R. at 466; Donaldson, IS6 B.R. at S4. 
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'~44.64 Bankruptcy sales are judicial sales," not execution sales," because unlike execution 
,~es, no levy or seizure of property is necessary for the trustee to complete the sale. 6' The 
: ,J.tere availability of the power to sell as a judgment creditor does not mean that bankruptcy 
es conducted pursuant to separate independent powers must also be considered execution 
es." The authors are unaware of any published cases involving the sale of property 
der Bankruptcy Code § 544. 
Some courts have employed the fiction of treating the filing of a bankruptcy petition 
an execution sale for purposes of lien avoidance under Bankruptcy Code § 522(f)," as 
II as in the determination of a trustee's rights vis-a-vis the debtor.'· Attempts to use this 
e fiction to defeat the trustee's rights to property based on his dual status as a judgment 
'tor have been rejected by the Ninth Circuit." In fact, the Ninth Circuit implicitly 
',jected the fiction when it stated that a debtor's right to use his exemption comes into play 
t at the filing of a petition (which it would if the fiction were employed), but only if and 
'hen the trustee attempts to sell the property.72 The use of the fiction against creditors, but 
, ot against trustees, is logical." 
I 
4AR£ed, 940 F.2d at 1322-23 &: n.7. Although 11 U.S.C. § 544. which gives a bankruptcy b'ustee the POWCB of a 
gment creditor, might be read to allow a trustee to sell the estate's property as a judgment creditor, such a sale would be 
istent with § 344'$ purpose: to allow the trustee to marshall assets or recover property which the trustee cannot recover 
er other avoiding powers. See In re Johnson, 28 B.R. 292. 297 (Bankr. N.D. III. 1983); 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 
.01 at 544-2 (15th ed. 1993). 
"Coppola, 211 Cal. App. 3d at 872 (sales pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363 conducted with court approval are judicial sales). 
i "Ewell. 958 F.2d at 280 (for purposes of FED. R. BANKR.. P. 7062, a bankruptcy sale is 8 judicial sale, not an execution 
or enforcement of judgment); Reed. 940 F.ld, at 1322 n.7 (distinguishing between a bankruptcy sale and an execution 
in the context of the ability to sell a debtor's residence)~ see also Transcontinental, 683 F.ld at 328 (refers to bankruptcy 
as judicial sales); CADA Investments, 664 F.2d at 1162 (refers to bankruptcy sales as judicial sales). 
67Ewell, 958 F.ld at 280; Travelers Ins. v. Lawrence, 509 F.2d at 89 (although both judicial sales and execution sales are 
cd sales, they are distinguishable); Transcontinental, 683 F.2d at 328; see Owen, 111 S. Ct. at 1835 (debtors' residences 
e property of the estate by operation of 11 U.S.C. § 541). 
'F.": "Cr Greene v. Franchise Thx Board, 27 Cal. App. 3d 38 (t972)(the state taxing agency hod two methods of enforcemen~ 
':. only one was specifically subject to exemptions. When the agency employed the second method of enforcement, the 
, ptions were inapplicable). 
L~se of this fiction provides "impainnent of an exemption" when there would be no exemption unless the property 
"' es subject to process or is converted into proceeds. In re Hennan, 120 B.R. 127, 131-32 (9th eir. BAP 1990). 
~. 
(, 'N 
t, '&hneider. 9 B.R. at 490; In re Sanford. 8 B.R. 761, 765 (N.D. Cal. 1981)", Donaldson, 156 B.R. at 54. 
'j.. '., 
ncr _d. 940 F,2d at 1322-23 & n.7. 
i: 12Hyman, 967 F.ld at 1321. 
t~ 
~ 13The fiction may be employed in actions to avoid creditor's liens because if the creditor were able to exercise his rights 
19' reduce the residence to proceeds, he would do so by execution sale and those proceeds would be exempt. But applied to 
~ bankruptcy sale, the fiction is improper because if the bankruptcy trustee reduced the property to proceeds punuant to his 
~ under Bankruptcy Code § 363, the proceeds would not be exempt 
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IV. PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS LIMITING THE EXEMPTION 
TO THE PROCEEDS OF EXECUTION SALES 
A. THE RULE OF LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION 
DOES NOT APPLY TO EXPAND 
THE SCOPE OF SECTION 704.720 
The Pladson court was criticized for not employing the rule of liberal interpretation 
of exemption statuteS.'4 The rule, however, cannot override statutory language and 
legislative history." Moreover, the rule does not apply to an exemption statute which limits 
an exemption to a specific type of property, e.g., proceeds of execution sales.'· Nor can 
the rule remove conditions (e.g., conversion of equity into execution sale proceeds) attached 
• 77 
to an exemptton. 
B. LIMITING THE HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION 
DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH FEDERAL POLICY 
OR THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION 
When Congresll enacted section 522(h)(1), granting the states the freedom to opt out 
of the federal exemption scheme in deference to their own exemption schemes, Congress 
did not require that the state exemption scheme be comparahle to the federal scheme and 
allowed states to provide for no homestead exemption if they so chose." Bankruptcy Code 
§ 522(h)(1) itself allows a debtor a homestead exemption of only $7,500, and offers no 
support for a higher exemption. California mirrored this $7,500 homestead exemption in 
section 703.l40(h)(I). 
Although the California Constitution'· requires that the Legislature protect a certain 
portion of a debtor's residence from forced sale, the requirement is not self-executing, and 
UDonaltison, 156 B.R. at 53. 
"Anderson, 824 F.2d at 759 ("[LJiberai construction in favor of the debtor does not give us license to rewrite the 
California Legislature's scheme for homestead protection. We are compelled by the statutory language and legislative history 
to conclude these debtors.ate not entitled to exemption .... "). 
"Pierson, 2 Cal.. 2d at 63. 
"Golden, 789 F.2d 698. In Golden, 'the Ninth Circuit held that requiring a debtor to use the proceeds of a voluntary 
prepetition sale of a homestead 10 purcbase another homestead within six months of the sale was a condition of exemption 
which survived bankruptcy. 
[Removing the condition] would fiustrale the objective of the California homestead exemption and the 
bankruptcy act itself, which limits exemptions to that provided by state or federal law. 
Id. at 700. 
"Owen, III s. a. at 1835; Pi/ral, 947 F.2d II 429; Golden, 789 F.2d II 700. 
"'CALIF. CONST. art. 20, § 1.S provides: 
The Legislature .ball protect, by law, trom fon:ed ssJ. • _ portion of the homestead and o1her property 
of all heads of families. 
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'by itself does not exempt any property.'" The Legislature has full autonomy and discretion 
'to establish the amount and scope of the homestead exemption. Because it has no duty to 
protect a debtor's residence from a bankruptcy sale the Legislature did more than it was 
:required when, pursuant to section 703.I40(b){1), it providcd bankruptcy dcbtors with a 
: homestead exemption in the equity of their homes. 
C. THE FUNDAMENTAL BALANCE BETWEEN CREDITORS' RIGHTS 
AND THE DEBTOR'S FRESH START 
SUPPORTS A LIMITED HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION 
,g Cases critical of Pladson have asserted that failing to apply section 704.720 to 
i:bankruptcy sales is akin to forcing a bankruptcy debtor to forfeit the homestead exemption 
W",hen filing for bankruptcy protection'! In fact, Pladson affects a debtor's rights only 
'!llllinimally. As with judgment debtors, a bankrupley debtor's homestead may be sold if the 
o!i~uity exceeds a certain amount. Pladson simply changes the amount. 
-::[ 
.J~; 
~:: Outside of bankruPtw, the section 704.720 homestead exemption operates to delay 
~!jIjudgment creditor from reaching the judgment debtor's residence until the debtor's equity 
" es a level deemed sufficient to ensure that the debtor can relocate.82 Creditors are 
· lowed to sell the judgment debtor's residence after the equity surpasses the exemption 
· el."' The purpose of section 704.720, in other words, is not to deny a creditor's ability 
sell a homestead to collect upon its debt, but only to delay that ability. Ultimately, the 
· reciation in the judgment debtor's residence benefits the creditor who can simply wait 
til the residence has sufficient equity before forcing the sale. The judgment debtor can 
, his exemption to retain a portion of the sale proceeds. A balance of the rights of both 
· achieved. 
A bankruptey filing upsets this balance. Shortly after the filing of bankruptcy, the 
t owing to the judgment creditor is discharged, thus eliminating the creditor's prospects 
t future collection through attachment and appreciation. The intended delay of the 
· reement of a creditor's rights becomes an unintended denial of those rights, contrary 
, the intent of section 704.720. 
Thus, the Legislature now allows the sale of a homestead once its equity exceeds 
· ,500, the amount set forth in section 703.l40(b). The Legislature had sound reason to 
it the section 704.720 homestead exemption to execution sales: to maintain the balance 
een debtors' rights and creditors' rights. The Legislature purposely may have placed 
proceeds of bankruptcy sales outside the scope of section 704.720 as a quid pro quo for 
-rteiffer v. Riehn, 13 Cal. 643 (1859) (interpreting a previous version of CALIF. CONST. art. 20. § 1.5);. San Diego County 
_-·r_ ... _rs Group Ins. v. Lorea, 112 Cal. App. 3d 221 (1980). 
I1Norman, IS7 B.R. at 465; Donaldson, IS6 B.R. at 54. 
· "Thorsby v. Baboock, 36 Cal. 2d 202, 20S (19S0). 
,- ta.rbe exemption level is set forth in CAL. COoo CIv. PROC. § 704.730. , 
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the discharge of debtS4 A bankruptcy debtor who will have all debts discharged probably 
does not need as great an exemption as a judgment debtor who remains liable for his 
debts."' Certainly, the homestead limitation is neither draconian86 nor unprecedented."' 
V. SPENCER REMAINS GOOD LAW 
A. POST-SPENCER NINTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS DO NOT CHANGE 
THE RESULT THAT SECTION 704.720 APPLIES 
ONLY TO PROCEEDS OF EXECUTION SALES 
Two Ninth Circuit cases decided after Spencer, In re Hyman" and In re Chabot," 
have tangentially discussed the scope of section 704.720.'" However, they did not consider 
Spencer and did not overrule, distinguish, or alter its holding. 
In Hyman, the court stated that a trustee could not sell property pursuant to section 
704.80091 unless there were sufficient sale proceeds to satisfY all encumbrances plus the 
*'when the policy behind legislation is not expressly stated, the court interpreting that legislation may properly attribute 
reasonable policy considerations to the legislature. See Talmadge, 832 F.2d at 112S. 
"Weiman v. Stopher (In re Weiman), 22 B.R. 49, 56 (9th Cir. Banke. 1982) (Kate, J. dissenting) ("In exchange for having 
their debts discharged, the unsecured creditors are given certain rights ... which have the effect of bringing into the estate 
aU property which CQuld have been available to them on the day bankruptcy was filed. The debtor. on the other hand, is given 
a discharge of his debts and receives a fresh start 
... .') 
"In the 50 states and three federal territories, there are 28 jurisdictions in which the exemption an individual may apply 
to his homestead does not exceed 510,000. Moreover, the largest single exemption which an individual can claim for a 
homestead in 10 of those jurisdictions is $7,500, while the largest single exemption which an individual can use for a 
homestead in 13 of those jurisdictions is less than S7.!!i00. See generally COLLIER BANKRUPTCY EXEMPTION GUIDE (Matthew 
Bender 1991~ 
"The declared homestead also does not apply to bankruptcy sales because the declared homestead exempts proceeds from 
voluntaJy sales. and voluntary sales do not occur within the context ofa bankruptcy. In re Cole, 93 B.R. 707,709 (9th Cir. 
BAP 1988); if. United States v. Teclmical Knockout Graphics, Inc. (In re Teclmical Knockout Graphics, Inc.). 833 F.2d 797. 
802 (9th Cit. 1987) (chapter 11 debtor's payments are involuntary because estate property cannot be distributed without 
Bankruptcy Code or court authority). 
"%7 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1992). 
"992 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1993~ 
to As discussed in Section III.B., supra, Spencer binds the federal courts. Pre-Spencer federal decisions allowing debtors 
to claim a § 704.720 exemption against a bankruptcy trustee sale were superseded by Spencer's interpretation of California 
law. 
"CAL CODE av. PROC. § 704.800 governs the circumstances under which a forced sale of a homestead may be 
pennitted. The Hyman court did not discuss whether forcing a bankruptcy 1rustee to comply with the provisions of § 704.800 
might violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution to the extent that the state law sale procedures conflict 
with the sale procedures set forth in the Bankruptcy Code and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedures. 
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btor's allowed homestead exemption.92 In its calculations, the court used the section 
'704.720 exemption because it already had been allowed." The Hyman court did not have 
;before it an objection to the homestead exemption and thus the case does not support a 
holding that the section 704.720 exemption was proper. 
!l! 
Itt,'" Chabot likewise fails to .offer any gui~ce on the. application of section 704.720 to 
,bankruptcy sales. The case dId not mvolve eIther section 704.720 or a bankruptcy sale, 
,but the debtor's motion to avoid judgment liens under Bankruptcy Code § 522(f) and 
,Sections 704.910-995.94 Thus, Chabot is neither controlling nor persuasive. 
B. POST-PLADSON CASES WHICH REJECT ITS ANALYSIS 
ARE NOT WELL-FOUNDED 
l' Two recent cases, In re Donaldson," and In re Norman,96 call Pladson bad policy . 
.Exercising judicial activism, both decisions struggle to find legal justifications to apply the 
·section 704.720 homestead exemptions to proceeds of bankruptcy sales. Both cases rely 
on faulty principles. 
~ 
, In Donaldson, a bankruptcy court allowed a debtor to exempt a residence from a sale 
by a bankruptcy trustee. The court specified five reasons" for its holding that the proceeds 
of a sale of a residence by a bankruptcy trustee are included in the scope of section 
104.720, each of which has been explored and refuted elsewhere in this article. 
In Norman, the court cited seven reasons" for allowing the debtor to protect his 
'1he determination of the applicable exemption in proceeds becomes important in CAL. CODE CIv. hoc. § 704.800 and, 
• in CAL. CoDE crv. hoc. § 704.720(8). ~ause before a forced sale can take place, the court must determine whether 
sale will satisfy the claimed exemption. 
"See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 112 S. Ct. 1644 (1992) (exemptions which might not otherwise be allowed may be 
. ed and used by bankruptcy debtors in the absence of timely objection). 
MChabot contains some language seeming to support the use oCthe declared homestead exemption in bankruptcy sales, 
as the issue before it was strictly a § 522(f) issue, its language is only dicta. 992 F.2d at 895. 
"IS6 B.R S3. 
i "157 B.R 460. 
"First. the Donaldson court held that Spencer did not apply because of the difficuhy of applying state homestead law in 
bankruptcy context. Second, the court inferred 8 legislative intent to expand the homestead legislation to bankruptcy sales. 
~. the court retied on legislative inaction, stating that the legislature never acted to amend the statutes after previous cases 
. owed § 704.720 to apply to bankruptcy sales. Fourth. relying on two cases involving the previous, significantly different 
ion of the homestead exemption, the court found that the proceeds of all forced sales fall within § 704.720. Finally, 
, lying on a case involving a debtor's right to avoid judicial liens under Bankruptcy Code § S22(f). the court employed legal 
. to fmd that bankruptcy sales are the equivalent of execution sales. 
"First,. the Norman court posited a Congressional intent to ensure 8 homestead exemption and a legislative intent to apply 
e § 704.720 homestead. exemption to bankruptcy sales. Second, it deemed the bankruptcy trustee 81 the equivalent of a 
gment creditor seeking to liquidate a money judgment Third, it failed to differentiate between applying § 704.720 to 
ankruptcy cues" and applying it to "bankruptcy sales," and fOWld that § 703.140(8) is superfluous unless it expands § 
(continued . . . ) 
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homestead from a bankruptcy sale. Each of these a/gIIJ1lents is unsound and has been 
discussed elsewhere herein. The court made a novel a/gIIJ1lent in support of its position that 
a bankruptcy sale is the equivalent of an execution sale, but upon close scrutiny the 
rugument crumbles." 
VI. SENATE BILL 651 DOES NOT REQUIRE 
THAT BANKRUPTCY DEBTORS RECEIVE 
A SECTION 704.720 HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION 
IN THE PROCEEDS OF A BANKRUPTCY SALE 
In September 1993, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 651 ("Bill'') changing the 
language of section 703.140(a), and the Bill was signed into law by Governor Wilson on 
October 10, 1993.100 This change will not affect the holding of Pladson or expand the 
scope of the section 704.720 homestead exemption when it is applied in bankruptcy cases. 
"( • . . <oatinucd) 
704.72010 blDkruptcy sales. Fourth. it applied § 704.800 without defining the amount of exemption, if any, which must be 
paid • debtor 10 allow. bankruptcy sale to proceed. Fifth. it held that Spencer did not apply because it did not involve 
bankrupb:y. Sixth. it believed that Plad30n precludes the application of any exemptions to bankrupk:y sales. Finally, it 
attributed the bankruptcy trustee's power of sale to his standing as a judgment creditor. 
"The No,.,.." court ...... that precedence C8II be fowd in CAL. COOB av. hoc. §§ 688.020 and 688.030 for 1reatins 
nonexceution tax sales like execution sales. IS7 RR. at 466. In fact, a comparison of tax sales and bankruptcy sales supports 
PkNbotts bolding. CAL. CooE CIv, PRoc. § 688.020(8) authoriz.ea the state to recover delinquent taxes by conducting a sale 
of property UDder CAL. CODE av. PROC. §§ 69'.0)0-709.030 ("Division 2"). Ifthc &tate elects the remedy of conducting 
• sale weier Division 2, then CAL. COoo CIv.1'ROC. § 688.030(aXI) allows the faxpayerto claim exemptions, including the 
§ 704,720 homestead exemption. However, if the stale chooses remedies other than those under Division 2. the sale is a 
different type of sale and exemptions ... not alloWed. Greene v. FnlllCbise Tax Bel., 27 Cal App. 3d 38 (1972). similarly, 
ifa baubuptoy trustee were to seU the debtor'. property punuant to Division 2 by using his pow ... under II U.S.CO § 544. 
the § 704.720 honiestcad exemption might be available 10 the debtor. The law is clear, however, that a trustee does not aelI 
aa a judgment creditor under II U.S.C. § 544, but as a bankruptcy trustee under II U.S.C. § 363. &e Section IIl.C., supra. 
Therefore, as in Gree1le, the § 704.720 homestead would not apply. 
loen.e Bill provides in part: 
SECTION I. Section 703.140 of the Code ofCiviJ Procedure is amended 10 read: 
703.140. (a) If. petilia •• iii .. In a case under Title 11 of the United States Code, all of 
the exemptions provided by this chapter inch<ding /he Ioontutead exemption, othec than the 
provisions of subdivision (b) efSlli •• ntil ..... U ~. a1¥' applicable regardless OfwMther 
there i$ a money judgment against the debtor or whether a money Judgment is being 
enforced by execution sale or any other procedu1¥' . .. 
SEC. 2.[sic] The Legislature fmds and declares that the amendment of § 703.140 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure by Section I of this ICI pertaining to exemptions in bankruptcy is not a change in. but is 
declaratory of, existing law. The Legislature further fmds and declares that the decision in In re Pladson. 1 S4 
B.R. 3o, (N.D. Cal. 1993), holding that the homestead exemption is not available in bankruptcy. is not a 
correct. interpretation ofCalifomia law. The Enforcement of Judgments Law provides exemptions for various 
fonus of property. It is not. and never bas been. the intention of the Legislature to restrict any of the 
exemptions in bankruptcy because of technical language concerning the procedures for claiming exemptions 
in lUte money judgment enforcement proceedings under the Enforcement of Judgments Law .... 
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A. THE BILL DOES NOT EXPAND THE SECTION 704.720 
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION TO INCLUDE 
BANKRUPTCY SALE PROCEEDS 
1. Section 703.140, As Amended, Is Dedaratory of Existing Law 
And Does Not Expand the Seope of tbe Homestead Exemption 
"" The rules of statutory construction discussed in section lIB, supra, apply to the Bill. 
,'The plain language of the statute controls unless it is directly contrary to all legislative 
·.history. 
,-; 
Section 1 of the Bill amends section 703.140(a) to state explicitly that all of the 
;Califomia nonbankruptcy exemptions apply to bankruptcy cases regardless of whether there 
,is a money judgment or whether a money judgment is being enforced.IOI The plain 
: ,language of amended section 703.140 allows bankruptcy debtors to claim exemptions 
, [regardless of whether there is a money judgment against them. 
The amended statute retains the use of the term "applicable," which does not connote 
'an expansion of the hemptions. It continues to apply the California exemptions in 
ibankruptcy without broadening their scope, 
: The section 704.720 homestead exemption (unchanged by the new legislation) still 
',applies only to execution sales and their proceedS.I02 As stated above, the amendment to 
lsection 703.140 removes any confusion regarding the need for a money judgment to be 
ienforced before the automatic homestead exemption is available in bankruptcy.lO' That is 
inol the same, however, as stating that the automatic homestead exemption is applicable to 
iproceeds of bankruptcy sales. So long as the property being exempted by section 704.720 
,is limited to execution sale proceeds, the exemption may only be employed in that context. 
2. The Legislative History of The Bill Does Not 
Contradict The Statute's Plain Meaning 
, The legislative history of amended section 703.140, set forth in section 2 of the Bill, 
'is not directly contrary to the plain language of the statute. The Legislature says both that 
i,the amendments reflect a declaration of existing law (that the exemptions apply in 
'bankruptcy) and that Pladson was incorrect when it held that the exemptions do not apply 
[in bankruptcy, 
, 
t IOIAlthough previous § 703.140 applied the exemption statutes in bankruptcy cases, the court in Norman. IS7 B.i. at 465, 
~held that a strict construction of the exemption statutes could prevent bankruptcy debtors from applying any exemption in 
!;bankruptcy unless the debtors were judgment debtors. 
unSee section m. supra. 
lOlSee note 97. supra. 
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The Legislature's statement that the amendments are a declaration of existing law is 
consistent with the plain meaning of amended section 703.140. The amended language 
reaffinns that the Califomia nonbankruptcy exemptions apply in bankruptcy cases even to 
debtors regardless of whether they have a money judgment against them, and to property 
regardless of whether it is subject to sale.'04 Consequently, notwithstanding additional 
legislative history, the plain meaning of amended section 703.104 should be applied105 
The Legislature's statement that Pladson was incorrect does not render the legislative 
history contrary to the amended statute's plain meaning, because the Legislature incorrectly 
summarized Pladson's holding. The Legislature viewed as incorrect Pladson's "holding" 
that the homestead exemption is not available in bankruptcy cases. Pladson actually stated 
that the homestead exemption is available in bankruptcy,"l6 but held that the homestead 
exemption's scope is limited and does not apply to bankruptcy sale proceedS.107 Pladson 
dealt with the applicability of the section 704.720 homestead exemption to bankruptcy 
sales, while section 703.140 deals with the applicability of the section 704.720 exemption 
to bankruptcy cases. The legislative history of amended section 703.140 confuses the two 
issues when it refers to Pladson's holding. The remaining language of the legislative 
history, however, indicates the Legislature's true concern was with applying the exemption 
in bankruptcy cases. 'The plain meaning of the amended language answers that concern by 
making it clear that t!te exemption does apply. 
It would be incorrect to construe amended section 703.140 to broaden the scope of 
section 704.720 to bankruptcy sale proceeds because it would be contrary to the statement 
that the amended section is declaratory of existing law. Section 703.140 as first enacted 
was never intended to expand the scope of the California exemptions. "lOI Hence, using 
section 703.140 to expand the scope of section 704.720 would not be declaratory of existing 
law. 
The Bill's legislative history does not override the plain meaning of its language. At 
best, the history supports the plain meaning. At worst, the history is confusing. At no 
point is it directly contradictory. 
IfMSee section II.B.3, supra. 
'''Belkei. 24 Cal. 3d. at 884-86; Boyd. 24 Cal. 3d at 294.97. 
IMPladson. 134 B.R. at 307 (bankruptcy debtors are entitled to a § 704.720 exemption when an execution sale is 
cnfocced). 
10'1.':4 B.R. at 306. 
100See section n.B.I.. supra. 
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B. EVEN IF THE NEW BIll IS DEEMED TO CHANGE THE LAW, 
IT WOULD NOT OVERRULE PLADSON 
OR CHANGE ITS RESULT RETROACTIVELY 
Pladson is currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. If the Ninth Circuit were to find 
the Bill, rather than being declaratory of existing law, substantively changes the law 
provide all bankruptcy debtors with an exemption under section 704.720 for all 
Inl3l1ikru.ptc:y sales, the amended law would not apply retroactively to Pladson or to any other 
I "i.<:a .. ,s pending before the Bill was enacted. 
When a court has interpreted a statute, the Legislature cannot overrule that decision 
enacting changes to the statute and stating that the changes are declaratory of existing 
Doing so would be an unconstitutional interference with the judicial function'09 and 
violate the separation of powers clause of the California Constitution."O 
Although a legislature may state that legislative amendments are declaratory of 
;exi.stillg law, the statement is suspect at best"' and courts are not bound to accept it."2 If 
r 
"'People v. Savala. 116 Cal. App. 3d 41, 60 (1981).ln &vaw, the California Supreme Court had interprered a criminal 
. The Legislature then passed a "C1ariflCation" statute which stated that the criminal statute always had had a meaning 
c",:onsistenlwith the Supreme Court dei::ision. The Savala court bad to decide whether to construe the criminal statute in 
conformity with the prior Supreme Court inteJpretat.ion or the legislation. On the grounds of stare decisis. the Savala cowt 
. held that it was bound to follow the Supreme Court. The Savala court also held that the Legislature's attempt to interpret 
statute after it has been passed upon by the judiciary could be a violation of the separation of powers clause of the 
Cailifo,mia Constitution. 
"'Rome in v. General Motors Corporation, 436 Micb. 515, 539 n.20, 546, 561 (1990), affd 112 S. Ct. 1I0S (1992)(The 
COIlrt I,elil 11001 tile ~!icllig'lR Constitution's separation of powers clause. which was virtually identical to California's, prohibited 
legislature from ovenuling cases but not from changing the law prospectively). CALIF. CONST. art. III,§ 3. reads as 
follows: 
The powers of state government ue legislative. executive. and judiCial. Persons charged with the exercise 
of ORe power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution. 
IllSee Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency &. Service. 108 S. Ct 2182. 2191 (1988) ("The views of a subsequent 
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one''); Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE 
Sytvania,.Inc., 100 S. Ct 2051, 2061 n.13 (1980) ("'Even when it would otherwise be useful. subsequent legislative history 
will rarely override a reasonable interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from its language and legislative history prior 
to its enactment'); United Air Lines. Inc. v. McMann. 98 S. Ct. 444, 449 n. 7 (1977) \,Legislative observations 10 yean after 
. of the Act are in no sense part oCthe legislative historyj. 
"'California Emp. Etc. Com. v. Payne, 31 Cal. 2d 210,213-44 (1947); Lawrence v. City ofConconl, 156 Cal. App. 2d 
531,534 (19S8). 
In PayM, the relevant statute of limitations was limited just prior to the plaintiff's filing of an action. The court 
: rejected as absurd the position that the addition of a limitation which was plainly absent from the statute as originally drafted 
. was a mere clarification of the statute. 
Uk.cwise, in Lawrence, a plaintiff claimed that he was statutorily entitled to reimbursement for constnlction of a stann 
drain. The plaintiff relied on an amendment to the relevant statute specifically including reimbursements for storm drain 
construction and a statement that the amendment coRJlituted a clarifICation of existing law. The court disregarded the 
legislative .ttatement that the amendment wu a declaration of existing law and ruled against plaintiff on the grounds that the 
original statute's language never applied to stonn drainB. 
But cf Union League Club v. Johnson, 18 Cal. 2d 275 (1941). There the court found that a change in a statute's 
Wording did not necessarily preclude it from being considered a clarification where the language in the original statu1e 
supported such a flOding. 
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the amendment to a statute is tenned a declaration or clarification of existing law, but 
actually effectuates a change in the law, the amendment is not retroactive.1I3 
Even if the ordinary presumption were that legislation mistakenly deemed declaratory 
by the Legislature should be deemed retroactive, the Bill could not apply retroactively. 
Bankruptcy Code § 522 only allows debtors to use exemptions in force at the time of their 
bankruptcy filing. Giving a change in the state exemption law retroactive effect in 
bankruptcy would violate the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.II< 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The holding of Spencer was clear and cannot be ignored: section 704.720, the 
California automatic homestead exemption, applies only to the proceeds of execution sales. 
Pladson properly followed the state court's holding when interpreting the exemption in a 
bankruptcy case. Because bankruptcy sales are not execution sales, the section 704.720 has 
limited applicability in bankruptcy cases. Debtors may still, however, claim an exemption 
of $7,500 under section 703.l40(b). This plain meaning construction of sections 703.140 
and 704.720 provides a result consistent with the other exemption statutes, the Bankruptcy 
Code, and publit policy, and is unchanged by Senate Bill 651. 
IIJpQ}'PNl'. 31 Cal. 2d at 214. 
U4/n re PCACIX!k,. 1198.R. 605. 6()9.610 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1990); In Ie McKeag. 104 B.R. 160. 163-65 (Bankr. D. Minn. 
1989); lee also Watson v. Kincaid (In,. Kincaid). 96 B.R. 1014, 1021 (9th Cir. SAP 1989), rev'd on other grounds. 917 
F.2d 1162 (1990). 
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